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Abstract
In this paper we set up a simple theoretical framework to study the possible source
country effects of skilled labor emigration. We show that for given technologies, labor
market integration necessarily lowers GDP per capita in a poor source country of
emigration, because it distorts the education decision of individuals. As pointed out by
our analysis, a negative source country effect also materializes if all agents face identical
emigration probabilities, irrespective of their education levels. This is in sharp contrast
to the case of exogenous skill supply. Allowing for human capital spillovers, we further
show that with social returns to schooling there may be a counteracting positive
source country effect if the prospect of emigration stimulates the incentives to acquire
education. Since, in general, the source country effects are not clear, we calibrate our
model for four major source countries – Mexico, Turkey, Morocco, and the Philippines
– and show that an increase in emigration rates beyond those observed in the year
2000 is very likely to lower GDP per capita in poor economies.
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1 Introduction
How to design migration rules is one of the most controversially discussed issues in policy
circles and the general public alike. Accounting for concerns of domestic unskilled workers,
many industrialized countries nowadays apply selective standards that bias immigration
quota toward skilled applicants. That such standards are beneficial for the host (i.e. the
immigration) country is by now broadly accepted in the economics discipline. To the
contrary, the consequences for the source (i.e. the emigration) country are not settled
yet. The rather small existing literature has focused on the effects that emigration of
educated workers has on those who do not emigrate. The traditional view is that such a
brain drain is harmful for the source country. As pointed out by Freeman (2006), with
exogenous schooling, a fall in the supply of skilled labor raises the wages of skilled non-
migrants, while at the same time it reduces the wages of unskilled workers, with negative
consequences for income of those who stay in the source country.1
Despite the loss of labor, a brain drain can as well be beneficial for the source country.
In particular, those who emigrate may pay remittances to their relatives at home or they
may bring with them knowledge and experience from the host country when returning in
later stages of their working career. A more recent literature has emphasized a further
channel through which the source country can benefit even if remittances and return
migration do not materialize. The prospect of emigration may raise the expected return
to schooling and thus render education more attractive. To the extent that only a small
fraction of those who are educated actually emigrates and there is a high social return to
education, those who are left behind may actually be better off after the brain drain (see
Mountford, 1997; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001). This argument has sparked a lot
of interest in recent years, because it indicates that selective immigration policies in the
industrialized world may be beneficial for developing countries as well.
In this paper, we set up a neoclassical model with a single production sector that al-
lows us to discuss the possible losses and benefits from emigration of educated workers in
a unified framework. Along the lines of the traditional migration literature, we consider
two types of workers who differ in their education levels. We enrich this simple framework
with several features that have been emphasized to be important in the new brain drain
1Based on the insight that brain drain harms those who are left behind, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974)
have called for a tax on educated emigrants in order to counter the negative effect.
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literature. In particular, we assume that migration is represented by a lottery with exoge-
nous emigration probabilities (which can be skill-specific). Furthermore, we assume that
the agents differ in their abilities and we account for adjustments in the schooling decision
that can either be triggered by changes in the emigration probabilities or changes in for-
eign wages. In contrast to recent work on the brain drain, however, we do not associate
schooling with a simple increase in the effective labor supply of workers (see e.g. Stark and
Wang, 2002) but instead assume that individuals who acquire education become skilled
and thereby complements to unskilled agents in the production process (see e.g. Egger,
Falkinger and Grossmann, 2007).
In this setting, we show how the prospect of emigration distorts the private schooling
decision with negative consequences for GDP per capita in South. In order to highlight
this distortion, we consider identical emigration probabilities for skilled and unskilled
workers in our baseline scenario. In this case, a higher emigration probability would not
affect GDP per capita in the source country if schooling was exogenous. This corresponds
to the traditional view on possible migration effects (see Freeman, 2006). However, with
endogenous schooling, individuals have an incentive to adjust their decision upon acquiring
education if relative wages in the host country differ from relative wages in the source
country. In the empirically relevant case of higher wage inequality in developing countries
– which are typically the source countries of brain drain – the incentives for participating in
schooling decline with a higher emigration probability. This result is in contrast to one of
the key findings of the new brain drain literature that a higher probability of emigration
boosts the incentives for education in the source country (see Stark, Helmenstein and
Prskawetz, 1998; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008).
In our baseline model with the same emigration probabilities for both skill groups, a
positive effect on educational attainment can only arise, if wage inequality in the source
country is lower than wage inequality in the host country. This, however, is at odds with
empirical evidence. In order to account for a positive impact of skilled labor migration on
schooling in the source country, we extend our model to selective migration with a posi-
tive emigration rate of skilled workers and no migration of unskilled ones (see Mountford,
1997). In this case, the prospect of emigration indeed increases the incentives for educa-
tion, irrespective of the prevailing international differences in relative wages. Despite this
difference to our baseline scenario, GDP per capita also deteriorates emigration if it has
an education bias. Similar to the traditional brain drain literature with exogenous school-
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ing, the loss of educated workers lowers skill intensity in production. This raises wages
of skilled workers and lowers wages of unskilled workers, with negative consequences on
GDP per capita. This effect is counteracted by an increase in the incentives to acquire
education. However, it turns out that the second effect cannot dominate and hence GDP
per capita is lower in the migration scenario than in a scenario without migration. This is
intuitive because the skill intensity typically deviates from its optimal level and less able
agents acquire education if migration is possible for skilled workers.
In a further extension to our model, we account for social returns to higher education in
order to address a channel for positive source country effects of a brain drain that sparked
a lot of interest in recent research. Similar to existing studies, we assume that the social
return arises due to a positive externality of education on total factor productivity. To
be more specific, we assume that total factor productivity depends positively on the skill
intensity in production (see Su¨dekum, 2006, 2008). In this case, the negative GDP per
capita effects of emigration are reinforced if schooling incentives fall, while the externality
counteracts the negative effect from the distortion in schooling, if acquiring education
becomes more attractive. Since it is in general not clear which of the two effects dominates,
we calibrate our model for four major source countries: Mexico, Turkey, Morocco, and
the Philippines. To give the new brain drain literature a fair chance, we choose a rather
accommodating parameterization of the human capital externality. The calibration results
indicate that even in this case there is little reason for being overly optimistic about
emigration of highly educated agents to boost GDP per capita through adjustments in
the schooling decision. However, it may still be possible that emigration leads to benefits
through other channels, which are excluded from our analysis, such as remittances or
return migration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review stylized
facts on emigration patterns, complementarities between skilled and unskilled workers,
wage inequality and social returns to schooling in order to motivate the key assumptions
in the theoretical model that we set up in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the main an-
alytical results for the baseline scenario with identical emigration probabilities for skilled
and unskilled workers. Section 5 provides two extensions. On the one hand, we discuss
selective migration in which only skilled workers are allowed to emigrate, while unskilled
workers are immobile. On the other hand, we introduce social returns to schooling by
accounting for an externality of education on total factor productivity. Section 6 reports
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the results from several numerical simulation exercises and provides insights on whether
positive GDP per capita effects of emigration can be expected when relying on realis-
tic parameter domains. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a brief summary of the most
important results.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we present a number of stylized facts which will guide our modeling ap-
proach. First, recent evidence suggests that emigration of uneducated workers from poor
countries is too important a phenomenon to rule it out by assumption. Second, we briefly
review recent evidence on the elasticity of substitution between different education groups
and come to the conclusion that technological complementarity between workers with dif-
ferent skills indeed exists. Third, we rely on several data sets and different methods to
show that real wage income is higher in the host country of emigration, while the educa-
tion premium is typically much higher in source than in host countries. Fourth, we review
evidence on social returns to schooling, since these returns have been emphasized to be
important in the recent brain drain literature.
2.1 Emigration rates
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) provide an extensive data set on migration patterns, which
has the unique advantage that it differentiates migrants according to their education levels.
At the same time, however, it has several disadvantages. In particular, the data contains
stocks of immigrants in OECD countries, but it does not provide the same information
for non-OECD members. Furthermore, the stock data is only available for the year 2000,
so that it cannot be used to compute bilateral flows. Finally, to make the data consistent
with our theoretical model, we have to adjust the number of education classes. Docquier
and Marfouk (2006) distinguish migrants with a low, medium and high schooling level.
Following the existing literature, we combine individuals with low and medium education
levels to the group of uneducated (or unskilled) workers, while a high level of schooling
refers to educated (or skilled) workers in our model. Despite these shortcomings, the data
set can still be used as a source of several interesting stylized facts.
These facts are summarized in Fig. 1, which depicts emigration rates for a collection
of (poor) countries that together account for about 75 percent of immigration into the
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OECD.2 The right-hand-side axis records the contribution of each country to the overall
stock of emigrants: 18 percent of all emigrants are Mexicans, about 5 percent are Turks,
about 4 percent are Indian, Chinese or from the Philippines, and so on. The smallest
contributer in this ranking is Peru, which accounts for less than 0.5 percent of world
emigration. The left-hand-side axis shows the skill-specific emigration rate for educated
(pe) and uneducated (pu) individuals. While, pe > pu holds for almost all listed countries
(with Bulgaria being an exception), the difference in emigration rates, pe − pu, is rather
small on average3 and it is particularly small for the two largest source countries, Mexico
and Turkey. For other, smaller source countries the gap may be larger. Particularly
remarkable in this respect are the very high emigration rates of small, poor island states.
For example, the emigration rate of educated individuals is 83 percent in Haiti and 85
percent in Jamaica. At the same time, however, we find that pu > 0 also holds in these
economies.
p  p  Sh          name
P Peru
T Taiwan
B Brazil
H Haiti
G Guatemala
E Ecuador
B Bulgaria
H Croatia
B Bosnia and Herzegovina
I Iran
C Colombia
R Romania
R Russia
P Pakistan
D Dominican Republic
D Algeria
S El Salvador
J Jamaica
Y Serbia and Montenegro
U Ukraine
C Cuba
M Morocco
K Korea
V Vietnam
P Philippines
C China
I India
T Turkey
M Mexico 0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
PER TWN BRA HTI GTM ECU BGR HRV BIH IRN COL ROM RUS PAK DOM DZA SLV JAM YUG UKR CUB MAR KOR VNM PHL CHN IND TUR MEX
Share in world stock of migrants (%, right hand axis)pe (%) pu (%)
Figure 1: Skill-specific emigration rates and the cumulated stock of emigrants.
One further remark is in order here. The data by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) does
not account for illegal and/or undocumented migration and hence the respective emi-
2Poor countries are defined to have per capita incomes below the world average in the year of 2000.
3The overall migration rate of educated workers is 5.4 percent while that of uneducated workers is 1.4
percent.
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gration rates in Fig. 1 may substantially deviate from true ones. The stock of illegal
immigrants is estimated to comprise about 30 to 40 million people worldwide, with ap-
proximately 10 million of these illegal immigrants living in the U.S. and a similar number
living in Europe (Papademetriou, 2005). These numbers are of course only rough es-
timates, but even if relying on rather conservative figures, the magnitudes involved are
substantial and the number of illegal immigrants is growing worldwide. Information about
the educational background of illegal migrants is scarce. A survey carried out by the Pew
Institute however shows that about two thirds of undocumented Mexican migrants in the
U.S. have only very low levels of education (Kochhar, 2005). Hence, it seems fair to
conclude that the omission of illegal immigration from the data shown in Fig. 1 biases
the emigration rates of uneducated workers downwards, with the respective bias being
possibly very large for Mexico.
In summary, we find some evidence for a brain drain from developing countries, but
ignoring migration of unskilled workers does not seem justified. In particular, regarding the
largest source countries emigration rates for skilled and unskilled workers are of comparable
size, implying that identical propensities for both skill groups are probably a fairly good
description of real world migration patterns.
2.2 Substitutability of different skills in production
One important assumption which distinguishes our analysis from previous contributions to
the new brain drain literature is that workers with different education levels are imperfect
substitutes in the production of goods. This feature of technology is widely documented
for OECD countries and it is indeed central to many explanations for rising wage inequality
(see, e.g., Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008). For non-OECD source countries of emigration,
evidence is rather scarce. However, a recent comparative study by Aydemir and Borjas
(2007) shows that the elasticity of substitution between different education levels is about
3 in Mexico.4 This is probably the best available estimate and we take it as representative
for other poor source countries in our numerical simulation exercises in Section 6.
4The hypothesis of workers being perfect substitutes up to efficiency differences is rejected at high
degrees of statistical significance.
7
2.3 Inequality measures
The economic literature usually views the participation in education as an investment
decision that is based on the (expected) income for different skill groups (see Becker,
1960). In closed economies the educational choice depends on domestic wages only. If
emigration is possible, foreign wages matter as well. In the following, we therefore discuss
evidence on both the skill premia within and differences in real labor income between
countries. We start with the latter.
Wage differentials between countries. Real wages in typical source countries of em-
igration are much lower than those in host countries. This is not surprising, since wage
differentials are major determinants of emigration (Borjas, 1987). However, the impor-
tance of the gap is striking. Focusing on low-skilled workers, Ashenfelter and Jurajda
(2004) compare real wages in the fast food sector across a wide range of countries. They
find that purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted U.S.$ wages for identical jobs in the
U.S., Japan, and Western Europe are four to five times higher than in Eastern Europe,
Korea, or Brazil. The respective difference is even more pronounced between rich indus-
trialized economies and China, India, or Colombia. However, the country coverage in this
study is fairly limited.
To overcome the problem of small sample size, Table 1 shows PPP adjusted GDP
per capita figures for the most important source counties of emigration (data column 4).5
Moreover, the last column presents GDP per capita of the source country relative to the
average GDP per capita of the host country of emigration. The host country averages
are thereby computed for each source country separately, using bilateral emigration rates
from Docquier and Marfouk (2006) as weights. The per capita income gap ranges between
1.43 for Taiwan to 14.36 for Vietnam in our data set. While this procedure allows us
to calculate the respective income gaps for a wide range of developing countries, there
is also a shortcoming of this approach: GDP per capita is only a rough measure of real
wage income because it also reflects other factors, like factor composition or interest rates.
However, we have to rely on this measure, because it is difficult to get detailed information
on real wages for a large set of developing countries.
5The information is taken from the Penn World Tables mark 6.2 and refers to year 2000 since for this
year we have data on skill-specific emigration rates (see above).
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Table 1: Characteristics of most important source countries
U/(U+E) (%) Gini (x100) Theil (x100)
GDP p.c. 
(PPP) Gini (x100)
GDP p.c. 
(PPP) q (%)
Peru PER 77.60 49.3 11.35 4205 38.41 30412 7.23
Taiwan TWN 80.90 31.6 1.44 19184 32.87 27391 1.43
Brazil BRA 91.60 59.8 7.79 7194 35.74 28218 3.92
Haiti HTI 99.00 59.2 2069 40.24 33194 16.04
Guatemala GTM 94.20 59.8 10.49 3859 41.39 34100 8.84
Ecuador ECU 81.30 56.0 9.04 4314 32.63 27722 6.43
Bulgaria BGR 80.90 33.2 7.99 7258 32.86 26359 3.63
Croatia HRV 89.90 36.5 2.46 8980 31.34 26701 2.97
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 89.90 26.1 3.93 3037 31.29 27644 9.10
Characteristics of most important low-and medium income countries sending migrants into rich destination countries
Source country
Destination
 (weighted averages)
Iran IRN 93.30 44.0 2.89 6046 36.03 29876 4.94
Colombia COL 90.10 57.8 4.14 6080 39.22 31063 5.11
Romania ROM 91.10 40.6 1.56 5211 33.64 27083 5.20
Russia RUS 79.90 48.7 5.93 9263 36.13 29648 3.20
Pakistan PAK 97.20 29.6 8.13 2477 35.28 27803 11.22
Dominican Republic DOM 85.50 47.6 9.10 6497 40.78 33182 5.11
Algeria DZA 93.70 35.4 1.54 5753 28.94 25060 4.36
El Salvador SLV 89.40 53.5 6.39 4732 30.60 26759 5.65
Jamaica JAM 95.90 48.7 30.93 4521 38.75 31405 6.95
Serbia and Montenegro YUG 86.25 37.3 11.81 2095 30.53 26764 12.78
Ukraine UKR 79.90 46.2 6.64 5003 36.75 30206 6.04
Cuba CUB 88.70 27.0 0.64 5699 41.19 33706 5.91
Morocco MAR 94.82 39.4 8.43 3720 30.59 24190 6.50
Korea KOR 74.20 37.1 2.05 15702 37.53 29976 1.91
Vietnam VNM 96.23 37.3 2189 38.64 31437 14.36
Philippines PHL 77.80 49.5 7.95 3826 39.17 31637 8.27
China CHN 97.30 39.0 0.41 4002 37.46 29865 7.46
India IND 95.20 36.0 9.17 2644 37.35 29693 11.23
Turkey TUR 91.50 39.8 6.90 5715 28.76 25707 4.50
Mexico MEX 88.70 54.6 4.23 8082 41.62 34288 4.24
Host countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Israel, Luxembourg, Sweden, 
Norway, France, Switzerland, New Zealand, USA, Japan, Netherlands. The sending countries shown in the table together account for more than 75% of immigration into the 
source countries. Destination Gini and Income per capita have been weighted using total bilateral emigration stocks.
Wage inequality within countries. With regard to cross-country differences in the
returns to schooling, we can rely on a large empirical literature. Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos (2004) provide a recent survey on Mincerian wage regressions. They report
that “[t]he highest returns are recorded for low-income and middle-income countries” (p.
112). For example, the average private return to an additional year of schooling ranges
between 11.3 and 13.4 percent in the OECD, between 13.6 and 18.8 in emerging non-
OECD countries, and between 24.6 and 37.6 in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, returns
also differ significantly within these groups of countries. In particular, they are smaller
in Europe than in the U.S. (See Wo¨ssmann, 2003, for a similar assessment.) Since the
schooling differential in years between educated and uneducated workers is roughly 8 to 10
years, the data suggest that the wage premium should be about 100 percent in continental
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Europe, slightly higher in the U.S. and above 150 percent in many source countries.
Also notable in this respect is a recent book edited by Lazear ans Shaw (2009) on
the structure of wages in several OECD countries. While not directly informative on the
wage differential between educated and uneducated individuals, the studies in this book
suggest that wage differentials exhibit important variation across countries. For example,
the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of the wage distribution in year 2000 is 2.72
in the U.S. and 1.91 in Germany. We may take these percentiles as representative for the
upper and the lower tier of the wage distribution and identify their ratio as a measure of
inequality between educated and uneducated individuals.
Data from existing country reports indicate that wage inequality importantly con-
tributes to overall income inequality, so that aggregate indicators of inequality can be
used to infer cross-country differences in the education premium. Data column 2 in Table
1 shows the most recent available Gini coefficients of overall income inequality for urban
populations in developing countries taken from the World Income Inequality Database.
Across the main source countries of emigration, the Gini coefficient varies between 27
percent (Cuba) and 59.8 percent (Brazil). We also compute the average Gini coefficients
in the host countries by weighing host country Ginis with source-country specific bilateral
emigration rates. Data column 6 contains the results of this calculations. It turns out
that, aside from only a few exceptions (most notably Cuba), inequality is larger in the
source than in the host countries of emigration.
Finally, to check robustness of our results, we can use information on wage inequality
across occupations in industrial sectors from Galbraith and Lu (2001). These authors
calculate the Theil index on wage inequality which reaches a value of 7 percent on average
in the 119 poorest countries while it has a value of 3 percent on average in the richest
25 economies. Data column 3 in Table 1 reports further details on this index for the
key source countries of emigration. While the Theil indices are only partly informative
about cross-country differences in returns to education they are highly correlated with
Gini coefficients (for which data coverage is higher). In summary, we can thus conclude
that the evidence in this subsection strongly suggests that wage inequality is considerably
higher in poor source countries than in the rich host countries of emigration.
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2.4 Social returns to schooling
There exists a large literature that emphasizes the positive spillovers from educated to
uneducated workers, implying that private and social returns to education differ. Indeed,
as pointed out by Schultz (1988, p. 545), “education is widely viewed as a public good (with
positive externalities), which increases the efficiency of economic and political institutions
while hastening the pace of scientific advancement on which modern economic growth de-
pends.” Theoretical work has also pointed to the relevance of human capital externalities
as a source of economic development (see e.g. Lucas, 1990). However, reliable empirical
work on the magnitude of these externalities is scarce and only available for industrialized
economies (mainly the U.S.).
Rauch (1993) uses micro-level data to quantify human capital externalities. Taking
the average schooling gap between educated an uneducated workers to be approximately 8
years, the numbers provided by Rauch imply that a 10 percent increase in average schooling
(evaluated at the minimum schooling requirement of 8 years) increases productivity of all
workers by about 2.4 to 4.1 percent. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) criticize that Rauch’s
estimates are likely to be upward biased due to problems of regressor endogeneity. They
propose to use a natural experiment to quantify the size of human capital externalities in
the U.S. In their analysis the externalities are rather small (not larger than 1 percent), and
they cannot reject the null hypothesis of returns being zero. The final word on the size
of spillovers is still out, in particular for our sample of poor source countries. However,
recent evidence for the U.S. suggests that human capital externalities are probably not
very large.
The conclusion that the social returns to schooling should not be expected to be large
also follows from the observation in the literature that a reliable estimate of these returns
should capture “the full social benefits of education which may contain any externalities
arising from education, and the full social costs of education, including any public funding”
(Wo¨ssmann, 2003, p. 373). Hence, by abstracting from the social costs of education the
results in Rauch (1993) may substantially overestimate the true social returns to education.
Things become even more complicated when taking into account that the social costs
of education critically depend on the prevailing schooling system and thus may differ
substantially between countries. For an assessment on how the existence of social costs
affects the returns to education, see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
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3 An emigration model with endogenous skill supply
We consider a small one-sector economy, ‘South’, which is populated by a unit mass of
individuals. The representative firm in this economy employs skilled, E, and unskilled,
U , labor to manufacture a homogeneous good Y . Considering a linear-homogeneous tech-
nology, we can write the production function in intensive form as Y = AUf(e), where
e ≡ E/U denotes the skill intensity in production and A measures total factor productiv-
ity (TFP).6 f(·) has the usual properties, f ′(·) > 0 and f ′′(·) < 0, and it satisfies the Inada
conditions. Hence, in line with the empirical evidence in Section 2, skilled and unskilled
labor are complementary production factors. All markets are perfectly competitive, so
that workers are paid their marginal products.
The local supply of skilled and unskilled labor is endogenous and depends on both
the individual education decision (discussed in detail below) and the emigration rates
of the two skill groups. Following the new brain drain literature (cf. Mountford, 1997;
Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001), emigration is modeled as a lottery outcome, with
all workers of a specific skill group facing the same probability of successful emigration,
pi ∈ (0, 1), i = E,U . We assume that the host country of emigration, ‘North’, is sufficiently
rich to render emigration always beneficial for Southern workers. Intuitively, this is the
case if TFP in South is sufficiently small.
Individuals in the Southern economy differ in their innate learning abilities a ∈ [0, 1].
These abilities are distributed according to a c.d.f. G(a), with G′(a) > 0. Educated agents
supply a efficiency units of skilled labor E, while uneducated agents supply one unit of
unskilled labor U .7 Hence, 1− a describes the private cost of education in terms of lower
working time. Risk neutral agents maximize expected income by choosing whether or
not to get educated. The expected income crucially depends on learning abilities and the
skill-specific propensities to emigrate. Using an asterisk to indicate Northern variables
and denoting skilled and unskilled wages per efficiency unit by r and w, respectively, the
expected return to a unit of skilled and unskilled labor is given by Er = per∗+(1− pe) r and
Ew = puw∗+(1− pu)w, respectively. The marginal individual, that is indifferent between
6For the moment, we treat A parametrically, while in Section 5 we assume that TFP depends positively
on the skill intensity in production in order to account for social returns to schooling.
7We do not account for the possibility that educated individuals execute unskilled tasks (see Davidson,
Matusz and Shevchenko, 2008). This presumes that the returns to skilled labor are higher than the returns
to unskilled labor, which we take for granted in the subsequent analysis.
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education and non-education, is determined by the cutoff ability condition a¯ = 1/Eω,
where Eω ≡ Er/Ew is the expected return to education. One can rewrite that condition
in terms of within-country wage inequality measures (i.e. skill premia) ω ≡ r/w and
ω∗ ≡ r∗/w∗, and the between-country unskilled wage differential q ≡ w∗/w :
a¯ =
1
Eω
=
1 + pu (q − 1)
(1− pe)ω + peω∗q . (1)
With a share pe of educated and a share pu of uneducated individuals leaving South to
work in North, the supply of unskilled and skilled labor that is available for production in
the source country is given by U s = (1−pu)G(a¯) and Es = (1−pe) ∫ 1a¯ adG(a), respectively.
Labor market clearing hence implies that the skill intensity in Southern production is given
by
e(a¯) ≡ (1− p
e)
∫ 1
a¯ adG(a)
(1− pu)G(a¯) , (2)
where lima¯→0+ e(a¯) = ∞, lima¯→1− e(a¯) = 0, and e′(a¯) < 0 hold. Intuitively, a higher
ability threshold means that less individuals participate in education and hence the skill
intensity in Southern production falls.
Using the skill intensity from Eq. (2) in the solution to the profit-maximization problem
of the competitive producers, which is characterized by r = f ′(e) and w = f(e) − ef ′(e),
it is straightforward to determine the skill premium (per efficiency unit of labor) in South
as well as the between-country unskilled wage differential. The equilibrium values of these
two variables are given by
ω =
f ′ (e(a¯))
f (e(a¯))− e(a¯)f ′ (e(a¯)) and q =
w∗
Af (e(a¯))− e(a¯)Af ′ (e(a¯)) , (3)
respectively. The first expression determines a positive relationship between the skill
premium ω and marginal ability a¯. This is intuitive, as a higher cutoff threshold reduces
the number of educated workers and thereby lowers skill intensity, with a positive impact
on the skill premium. Furthermore, under a linearly homogeneous production technology
the higher skill premium is associated with a decline in the absolute return to unskilled
labor in South and, hence, between-country unskilled wage inequality must increase for a
given w∗. This explains the positive relationship between a¯ and q as determined by the
second expression in Eq. (3).
The equilibrium cutoff ability, skill intensity and wage inequality are jointly determined
by Eqs. (1)-(3). Fig. 2 illustrates the equilibrium in the (1/Eω, a¯)-space. The upward-
sloping 45-degree line depicts the left-hand-side of Eq. (1). Furthermore, substituting
13
Eq. (2) into Eq. (3) and using the resulting expression in the right-hand-side of Eq. (1)
gives a function Ω (a¯), which is positive, monotonic, and strictly decreasing in a¯. It is
convex to the origin and satisfies lima¯→0 Ω (a¯) =∞.8 When a¯ goes up, a smaller fraction
of agents invests into schooling and the education intensity in production goes down (see
Eq. (2)). This puts downward pressure on wages for uneducated agents, while those of
educated individuals rise. Hence, both the inverse of the skill premium, 1/ω, and 1/Eω
fall. Fig. 2 shows that the model exhibits a unique equilibrium, with the equilibrium
cutoff ability level being denoted by a¯(pe, pu) to indicate the dependence of the cutoff level
on the prevailing emigration rates, pe and pu.
-
6
45◦
a¯(pe, pu)
Eω−1
a¯
1/Eω
Ω(a¯)
Figure 2: Equilibrium in the source country
In the next two sections, we are particularly interested in the effects that emigration
exhibits on the source country. To determine these effects, we look at the change of GDP
8An explicit solution for Ω(a¯) is given by
Ω (a¯) =
puw∗ + (1− pu)A [f (e (a¯))− f ′ (e (a¯)) e (a¯)]
per∗ + (1− pe)Af ′ [e (a¯)] ,
from where it is straightforward to calculate Ω′ (a¯) < 0, when accounting for e′(a¯) < 0.
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per capita.9 GDP per capita is given by
V =
(1− pu)G (a¯)Af (e (a¯))
(1− pe) + (pe − pu)G(a¯) , (4)
where (1 − pe) + (pe − pu)G(a¯) represents the size of resident population in South (i.e.
the number of non-migrants). Furthermore, since GDP per capita adjustments do not
account for changes in the distribution of income, we also calculate income inequality
between educated and uneducated non-migrants. Notably, income inequality differs from
the skill premium per efficiency unit of labor, because it also depends on the level of
efficiency units provided by skilled workers. Denoting effective labor per educated worker
by ρ ≡
[∫ 1
a¯ adG(a)
]
/ [1−G (a¯)], income inequality in South is given by R ≡ ωρ.
This completes the description of the formal setup. In the following section, we provide
a comparative-static analysis on the effects that a change in the emigration probabilities
exhibits on the source country. Thereby, we rely on the empirical observation that in the
two largest source countries, Mexico and Turkey, there is not a sizable difference between
the emigration rates of educated and uneducated workers and, hence, assume pe = pu ≡ p.
The case of (quality-)selective migration with pe > 0 and pu = 0 is considered in Section
5.
4 The case of identical emigration probabilities
We now consider emigration probabilities that are the same for both education groups.
Then, the impact of a higher propensity to emigrate on cutoff ability a¯ and skill premium
ω can be summarized in the following way.
Proposition 1. A pari passu increase in the emigration propensities for both education
groups lowers (raises) the incentives for education if the skill premium in the host country
is lower (larger) than the skill premium in the source country. The skill premium in South
increases (declines) in this case.
9It is notable that in general changes in GDP per capita need not to be identical to changes in total
income of those who are left behind. The reason is that the the average income of emigrants can differ
from GDP per capita prior to migration. Due to this observation, we have studied the consequences of
emigration on total income of non-migrants in a previous version of this manuscript. However, since the
effects on total income of non-migrants and GDP per capita turned out to be qualitatively the same in
the considered scenarios, we have decided to simplify our analysis and thus only look on GDP per capita
changes in the subsequent analysis.
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Proof. Analysis in the text.
The impact of an increase in emigration propensity p (≡ pe = pu) on a¯ and ω can be
read off from Fig. 2. A higher p increases the expected income of both skill groups,
because of r∗ > r and w∗ > w. The expected income shift is however more pronounced for
uneducated workers if the skill premium in North is lower than the skill premium in South
and, hence, schooling becomes less attractive. Graphically, the Ω(a¯)-locus shifts outwards
in Fig. 2, implying an increase in a¯. Since not all agents who change their schooling
decision in view of the higher emigration propensity can indeed emigrate, the prospect
to emigrate induces an underinvestment in education and hence it leads to an increase
in the Southern skill premium. Conversely, if the skill premium in North is higher than
the skill premium in South, the incentives for acquiring education increase. In this case,
the Ω(a¯)-locus shifts inwards in Fig. 2, so that a¯ increases. Since not all newly educated
workers can actually emigrate, there is overinvestment in education with a negative effect
on the Southern skill premium.
The result in Proposition 1 is remarkable, because it qualifies the insight from the
new brain drain literature that higher emigration probabilities render the participation in
schooling more attractive and, hence, can be interpreted as a substitute for an education
subsidy in developing countries (see Stark and Wang, 2002). As it turns out from our
analysis, if the increase in emigration propensity for skilled workers is accompanied by
a pari passu increase in the propensity to emigrate for unskilled workers, the schooling
incentives fall in the empirically relevant case of a higher skill premium in the poor source
than the rich host country of emigration.10
Even though the case of a higher Southern skill premium seems to have considerable
empirical support, we do not need to impose any assumption concerning the relation
between ω and ω∗, when deriving our results on GDP per capita effects. The reason is
that except of the borderline case with ω = ω∗ emigration distorts the private schooling
decision and, hence, always exhibits a negative effect on per capita income. For a more
formal treatment of the respective GDP per capita effect, we can note that in the case of
identical emigration rates, Eq. (4) simplifies to V = G (a¯)Af (e (a¯)). Then, the following
result is immediate.
10Clearly, in our model cross-country differences in the skill premium are only a good proxy for the
cross-country differences in income inequality if the effective skilled labor supply per educated worker does
not differ too much between the source and the host country of emigration.
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Proposition 2. An increase in the emigration probability p leaves GDP per capita unaf-
fected if the schooling decision and thus cutoff ability a¯ as well as the skill intensity e (a¯)
remain unaffected. In contrast, if the increase in p leads to an adjustment in the schooling
decision and thus to a change in cutoff ability a¯ and in skill intensity e (a¯), GDP per capita
falls.
Proof. We can consider dV/dp = dV/da¯× da¯/dp. Noting that dV/da¯ = G′(a¯)Af (e(a¯)) +
G(a¯)Af ′ (e(a¯)) e′(a¯) and substituting e′(a¯)G(a¯)/e(a¯) = −G′(a¯) [1 + a¯/e(a¯)], according to
Eq. (2), implies
dV
da¯
= AG′(a¯)
[
f (e(a¯))− f ′ (e(a¯)) e(a¯)
(
1 +
a¯
e(a¯)
)]
,
Using Eqs. (1) and (3), we further obtain
dV
da¯
= AG′(a¯)f ′ (e(a¯))
[
pq
ω [(1− p)ω + pω∗q]
]
(ω∗ − ω) .
Noting from Proposition 1 that da¯/dp >,=, < 0 if ω >,=, < ω∗, we can conclude that
dV/dp < 0 if ω 6= ω∗ and dV/dp = 0 if ω = ω∗. This completes the proof of Proposition
2.
The prospect of emigration implies that the incentives for education become increasingly
dependent on Northern relative factor prices. However, only local technology conditions
are relevant for maximizing GDP per capita in South. An increase in p widens the gap
between the incentives for schooling and the optimal relative Southern skill intensity, as
long as the factor price differential in North and South do not coincide (i.e., ω∗ 6= ω). If
the incentives for education do not change, i.e. if a¯ is constant, the relative skill supply
remains unaffected and so does GDP per capita. Hence, the negative GDP per capita
effect of a pari passu increase in the emigration propensity of educated and uneducated
workers do not materialize in a model with exogenous skill supply.
Beyond the GDP per capita effects of emigration, we can also determine the distri-
butional consequences in the Southern economy by looking at the impact that a change
in the emigration propensity exhibits on income inequality R. The following proposition
summarizes these effects.
Proposition 3. An increase in migration propensity p raises (reduces) the income ratio
R(a¯p), if the skill premium in South is higher (lower) than the skill premium in North,
i.e. if ω > (<)ω∗.
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Proof. We can substitute e′(a¯) < 0, according to Eq. (2), and dω/de(a¯) < 0, according to
Eq. (3) into dω/da¯ = e′(a¯)dω/de(a¯), to conclude that dω/da¯ > 0. Furthermore, we can
note that dρ/da¯ = G′(a¯)
[∫ 1
a¯ [a− a¯]dG(a)
]/
[1 − G (a¯)]2 > 0. Putting together, we thus
obtain dR/da¯ > 0. Noting finally da¯/dp >,=, < 0 if ω >,=, < ω∗ from Proposition 1,
completes the proof of Proposition 3.
By virtue of Proposition 3, the distributional consequences of emigration depend on
whether the skill premium in South is lower or higher than the skill premium in North.
Emigration into an egalitarian economy (with ω > ω∗) raises both the skill premium ω
and the income ratio between educated and uneducated workers, R. The opposite holds
true for emigration into a non-egalitarian country (with ω < ω∗). As empirical stylized
facts indicate that North is more egalitarian, we can conclude that a pari passu increase
in the emigration propensities for both education groups not only lowers GDP per capita
but it also raises income inequality in South.
5 Extensions
The aim of this section is twofold. In Subsection 5.1 we study the consequences of a
(quality-)selective immigration policy in North, which implies that emigration is only an
option for educated Southern individuals. This allows us to check robustness of our results
with respect to changes in the migration lottery. In Subsection 5.2 we briefly discuss the
role of social returns for the GDP per capita effects of a brain drain.
5.1 Selective migration
In line with the setup in Section 3 we assume that emigration is the outcome of a lottery,
with skill-specific propensities pe > 0 and pu = 0. Unfortunately, with selective migration
the formal analysis turns out to be quite complicated with a general linear-homogeneous
production technology. Therefore, we rely on a Cobb-Douglas technology in the subsequent
analysis. In particular, we assume Y = AG(a¯)eαE , with eE ≡ (1 − pe)e(a¯) and α ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, in the interest of readability we discuss our results in an intuitive way and
refer the reader interested in the formal derivation of our results to the working paper
version of this manuscript in Egger and Felbermayr (2007).
If North introduces a (quality-)selective migration policy, there is a direct negative
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effect on Southern GDP per capita due to a loss in the mass of educated workers and,
hence, a fall in skill intensity for given private schooling decisions. However, there is
also an indirect effect, because the expected income for skilled workers and, therefore,
the incentives to acquire education increase (recall r∗ > r). As a consequence, cutoff
ability a¯ falls and e(a¯) increases. Graphically, a higher pe shifts the Ω(·)-locus inwards
in Fig. 2. The increase in e(a¯) counteracts the negative effect on skill intensity eE and,
in fact it may overturn it if the elasticity of labor supply with respect to cutoff ability a¯
is sufficiently large.11 Irrespective of whether eE is higher or lower in the scenario with
selective migration than in a scenario without migration, GDP per capita will definitely fall
when skilled workers obtain a prospect of emigration. The reason for a negative impact
on GDP per capita is twofold. On the one hand, with selective migration, the private
schooling decision cannot be expected to establish an efficient skill intensity outcome and,
on the other hand, less able agents acquire education in the source country.
While the GDP per capita effect of selective migration is unambiguous, the distribu-
tional consequences turn out to be less clear. This has the following reason. As pointed
out above, there are two counteracting effects of selective migration on skill intensity in
production, with the sign of the overall impact being unclear. However, since under a
Cobb-Douglas technology the skill premium is inversely proportional to skill intensity and
given by ω = [α/(1 − α)][(1 − pe)e(a¯)]−1, the impact of selective migration on the skill
premium is unclear as well. With the skill premium per efficiency unit being a crucial
determinant of factor return R, it is hence not surprising that in response to selective
migration income inequality may decrease or increase. The compositional effect, however,
reinforces the indirect negative effect on ω due to changes in the schooling decision, so
that a decline in the skill premium is sufficient for a decline in relative factor return R.
11There is a notable difference to our baseline model with identical emigration propensities for both
education groups. In this baseline model a change in the propensity to emigrate does not exhibit a direct
impact on skill intensity. Put differently, for a given cutoff ability a¯, an increase in the propensity to
emigrate does not affect the skill intensity if pe = pu (see our discussion in Section 4). Hence, a higher
propensity to emigrate only affects the skill intensity to the extent that it changes the incentives to acquire
education and thus cutoff ability a¯.
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5.2 Social returns to education
In this subsection we account for social returns to education, which have been put forward
in the brain drain literature as the driving force behind positive GDP per capita effects
of emigration (see Beine, Docquier and Marfouk, 2001). In particular, we assume that
total factor productivity, A, depends on the skill intensity in the production process. (See
Su¨dekum, 2006, 2008 for a similar approach.) More specifically, we postulate that A = eγE ,
where γ is a positive parameter. This opens a second channel through which a change
in schooling incentives affects per capita output in the source economy. Quite generally,
whenever eE falls due to emigration – which happens, e.g., when pe = pu and ω > ω∗ – the
negative GDP per capita effect derived above is magnified. In contrast, when eE rises –
which may happen, e.g., in the case of selective migration with pe > pu = 0 – the negative
GDP per capita effect is counteracted and, possibly, average income in the source country
increases. Hence, at least in this case, accounting for a social return to education may
generate an ambiguity in the GDP per capita effects of emigration on the source country.
In order to assess the likelihood of a positive GDP per capita effect, we use numerical
simulation techniques to quantify the positive and negative implications of emigration.
Before we turn to these numerical exercises in Section 6, we briefly discuss the role
of social costs as another important determinant of the social returns to education (see
Section 2). There is no doubt that in virtually all countries some part of education
is provided by the public sector. Our model is flexible enough to account for public
provision and finance of education. To see its impact, we can denote by D the fixed
amount of public education spending, which is financed by a proportional tax τ ∈ (0, 1)
on local wage income. With respect to the education technology, we abstract from rivalry
and assume that an educated worker with ability a supplies aD efficiency units of skilled
labor. Supposing for simplicity that pe = pu = p > 0, the government budget constraint
is
D = τ(1− p)AG(a¯)f (e (a¯)) . (5)
Proposition 2 states that if ω 6= ω∗, emigration lowers GDP per capita, V = AG (a¯) f (e (a¯)).
Hence, with D being constant, Eq. (5) implies that the tax burden for non-migrants in-
creases. All other things equal, this reinforces the negative effects of a migration lottery
on the group of non-migrants.12
12In the presence of migration, the Southern policy makers may want to cut back on D. This incentive
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6 Quantifying the effects of brain drain
In order to assess whether, in the presence of social returns to education, GDP per capita
can be stimulated by a brain drain, we conduct a numerical simulation analysis for four
important source countries: Turkey, Mexico, Philippines and Morocco. The first two
economies feature a very low gap in the propensities to emigrate for educated and unedu-
cated workers and their average income differential vis-a´-vis the host countries is not too
big and similar in size. The latter two economies both display a strong bias of emigration
rates toward educated workers. They are poorer than the former two ones, but between
them, they are comparable regarding their relative average income gap to their respective
average destination countries.
To calibrate our model, we need to parametrize the production function. For this
purpose, we consider a (CES) technology with a constant elasticity of substitution between
educated and uneducated workers of σ. In line with evidence for Mexico discussed in
Section 2.2 we set σ = 3.13 Our discussion of empirical evidence on the quantitative
importance of human capital spillovers in Section 2.4 leads us to compute two scenarios,
one for γ = 0 and the other for γ = 0.36. This parameter choice spans the most extreme
values found in the literature and may therefore delimit the interval within which the
‘true’ extent of social benefits may lie. Note, however, that the more recent empirical
literature strongly points toward social benefits that are closer to zero. Furthermore, we
do not account for social costs of education and, hence, by setting γ = 0.36 we are likely
to significantly overestimate the possible GDP per capita gains from brain drain.
To determine the supply of skilled and unskilled labor, we proceed in two steps. First,
we calibrate the share of educated workers in total labor income such that, at the observed
emigration rates14 shown in Table 1, the respective economies reproduce empirically rea-
sonable education premia of 3.5 in Mexico, 3.2 in the Philippines, 2.6 in Turkey and 2.5
in Morocco.15 Second, regarding abilities we simply consider a uniform distribution. This
is taken into account in Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann (2007).
13Choosing σ = 1 would lead to a Cobb-Douglas technology as the one considered in Subsection 5.1. Also
note that our model would converge to the standard new-brain-drain literature benchmark case without
losses from emigration due to changes in skill intensity (see e.g. Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1998)
when σ →∞.
14The emigration rates in 2000 are pe = 15.3, pu = 12.07 for Mexico; pe = 5.82, pu = 5.59 for Turkey;
pe = 16.96, pu = 7.00 for Morocco; and pe = 13.73, pu = 2.17 for Philippines.
15We compute the ratio between Gini coefficients of income inequality and the 75th to the 25th percentile
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seems the most natural choice given the absence of direct evidence. Since our theoretical
results do not hinge on specific functional forms of G (a), we can be optimistic that the
choice of a uniform distribution does not restrict the generality of our results in qualitative
terms.
In all numerical exercises, we fix the education bias of emigration b ≡ pe/pu, by the
empirically observed value for the year of 2000 and plot the cutoff ability a¯, the skill
premium ω (whose benchmark value at observed emigration rates turns out to be higher
than ω∗ in all of our exercises), GDP per capita V (relative to its initial level without
migration) and income inequality R as a function of pe.
6.1 The case of non-selective migration
Figure 3 shows the results from our numerical exercises for Turkey and Mexico when
γ = 0. In the case of Turkey, there is almost no education bias (b = 1.04), since pe and pu
are of approximately similar magnitudes according to Fig. 1. Hence, we expect that the
numerical analysis replicates the results in Propositions 1 and 2. In the case of Mexico,
educated workers have an emigration probability that is about 3 percentage points larger
than the one for uneducated agents and the education bias of emigration b is equal to
1.27. Income in both source countries is four to five times smaller than the emigration-
rate weighted average income in the respective host countries. In both economies the
degree of domestic inequality is larger than the weighted foreign counterpart.
The numerical exercise clearly shows that, given the absence of an education bias,
an increase in the emigration rate lowers education incentives and, hence, drives up a¯ in
Turkey. This is because the expected return to schooling falls, once foreign employment
opportunities are taken into account. Furthermore, we find that along with an increase in
the cutoff ability level, emigration reduces GDP per capita. In the status quo, where pe is
about 6 percent, GDP per capita is 0.1 percent lower than in the counterfactual situation
with no migration. It would be 0.25 percent lower if the emigration rate were to double.
Proposition 3 suggests that the factor income ratio R should increase if b is identical to
unity. Our simulation exercise confirms this and shows that emigration has a sizable effect
on inequality.
ratio of the earnings distribution (which we take as a proxy for the wage premium). Data on percentiles
is available for the OECD, so that we use the OECD multiple to calibrate wage premia for our source
countries using their reported Gini coefficients.
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Figure 3: Turkey and Mexico: Welfare and distribution effects of emigration without spill-
overs.
The case of Mexico is different since b is substantially above unity. In this case, an
increase in pe boosts education incentives because it increases the likelihood of emigration
overproportionally for educated workers. As a consequence, a¯ falls and a higher fraction of
individuals receive schooling, when pe increases. Abstracting from a positive externality
of schooling, the distortion in the education decision leads to a fall in GDP per capita of
Mexico. In contrast to the case of Turkey, the effect of an increase in pe on Mexican income
inequality is inversely hump-shaped. At the observed level of pe = 0.15, the predicted
income inequality is lower than in the counterfactual where pe = 0, but variation in R due
to migration is much smaller than in the case of Turkey.
Figure 4 allows for a positive externality of human capital formation on total factor
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productivity. In both countries, we set the size of the externality to the highest justifiable
level and assume γ = 0.36. Since the education bias in emigration rates is fairly low in
Turkey, we would expect from our discussion in sections 4 and 5.2 that the negative GDP
per capita effect is even more pronounced if education exhibits an externality on TFP. The
reason is that with wage inequality being higher in the source than in the host country
of emigration, a pari passu increase in the propensities to emigrate for both skill groups
lowers the incentives to acquire education and hence reduces the skill intensity in source
country production. This intuition nicely bears out in Figure 4. Furthermore, the impact
of a change in the propensity to emigrate on income inequality in Turkey remains almost
unaffected by the introduction of a Hicks-neutral positive externality of schooling on TFP.
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Figure 4: Turkey and Mexico: Welfare and distribution effects of emigration with spill-
overs.
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Things are different in Mexico, where the education bias of emigration is more pro-
nounced than in the case of Turkey. Due to this bias, a higher participation in schooling
induces an increase in TFP, which counteracts the negative impact on GDP per capita
from the distortion in the private education decision. For relatively low emigration rates,
the first effect dominates and hence GDP per capita increases when the propensity to
emigrate goes up. Evaluated at status quo emigration rates (pe = 0.15), however, it is the
second effect that dominates and GDP per capita turns out to be slightly lower (−0.2%)
than in the counterfactual situation with no migration. From Fig. 4 we can conclude that
the GDP per capita effect of an increase in the emigration propensity is hump-shaped and
reaches a maximum at rather low levels of emigration rates. Interestingly, at status quo
emigration rates, γ = 0.36 turns out to minimize the loss, while lower or higher values of
γ turn out to further increase it. The reason is that any change in TFP affects the relative
incentive to acquire human capital through its impact on between country inequality. This
can further dissociate actual enducation decisions from those that would maximize GDP
per capita.
6.2 The case of selective migration
We now turn to a numerical assessment of the impact of emigration on Morocco and
the Philippines. In both countries, emigration rates are strongly biased toward educated
workers (see footnote 14). Hence, the emigration patterns differ substantially from the
stylized setup in Section 4. However, the empirical patterns also differ from those assumed
in Section 5.1, as emigration of uneducated workers seems to be important as well. Fur-
thermore, the elasticity of substitution between educational classes is assumed to be 3 in
our numerical exercises, while it was set equal to one in the selective migration scenario
studied in Section 5.1.
Fig. 5 depicts the situation without any externality in human capital formation (i.e.
γ = 1). As expected, from the analysis in Section 5.1, (quality-)selective migration raises
the incentives for acquiring education and hence it lowers the ability cutoff for education, a¯.
While this is true for either economy, the effect turns out to be stronger in the Philippines,
whose average host economy (of emigration) features a larger degree of earnings inequality.
In both countries, overall income inequality, R, falls. Turning to GDP per capita, the
numerical exercise confirms our insights from the analysis in Section 5.1, at least for the
emigration rates depicted in Fig. 5. In both countries, GDP per capita is lower in the
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Figure 5: Morocco and Philippines: Welfare and distribution effects of emigration without
spillovers.
status quo than in the reference case of no emigration. The loss is quite dramatic: 2.5%
in the case of Morocco (at pe = 0.17) and 3.9% in Philippines (at pe = 0.14).
Next, we analyze a scenario with a positive externality of schooling. The respective re-
sults for Morocco and the Philippines are depicted in Fig. 6. Since social returns to human
capital formation are usually believed to be strongest for middle-income countries, and
substantially weaker for very poor ones, we set γ = 0.1 to parametrize the externality.16
For this parameter value, we find that a higher propensity to emigrate not only raises the
16Clearly, with γ = 0.36 the TFP externality would be stronger and, hence, a positive GDP per capita
effect of higher emigration rates more likely. However, note that also the elasticity of substitution σ plays
a crucial role, with lower values making losses more likely and larger.
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incentives to acquire education but it may indeed stimulate GDP per capita due to an
increase in TFP. In the case of Morocco, a positive GDP per capita effect materializes
only for rather small emigration rates, while at the status quo rates its GDP per capita is
lower than in the counterfactual situation of no migration. In contrast, in the Philippines
the GDP per capita is higher for almost all considered emigration rates and it reaches a
maximum at a rate that is not too far away from its status quo. Similar to Turkey and
Mexico, the inclusion of a schooling externality does not influence the distributional effects
of emigration significantly.
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Figure 6: Morocco and Philippines: Welfare and distribution effects of emigration with
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7 Concluding remarks
Can skilled labor emigration really be beneficial for the source country, as claimed by the
new brain drain literature? To address this question, we have set up a simple model to
study the potential losses and benefits of skilled labor emigration in a unified framework.
In particular, we have shown that, irrespective of whether emigration is biased toward
education or not, it always lowers GDP per capita in the source country, if schooling is
endogenous. Furthermore, accounting for social returns to schooling, which are assumed
to arise due to an externality of education on total factor productivity, we show that the
negative effect on the source country is amplified if the prospect of emigration reduces the
incentives to acquire education, while a positive effect of a brain drain possibly materializes
if education is stimulated and not all newly educated workers can actually emigrate.
Since with social returns to schooling the effects of a brain drain are not clear in
general, we rely on numerical simulation techniques to assess the relative strength of
the counteracting forces for four important source countries of emigration. Our numerical
exercise highlights that GDP per capita effects of skilled labor emigration critically depend
on a number of important source country features, such as the education bias of emigration,
the degree of income inequality relative to the average host country, and, most importantly,
the size of the human capital externality. Relying on rather large values for the size of this
externality, we find that in only one out of four cases, the source country may indeed have
a higher GDP per capita under status quo emigration rates than in the counterfactual
no migration scenario. However, even this result may be too optimistic, because, aside
from considering a parameterization of the externality which is at the upper bound of
empirically realistic levels, we have totally ignored social costs of education, which arise
due to public finance of the schooling system. Indeed, accounting for these costs will
substantially reduce the social returns to education and, hence, we can conclude that
in contrast to the main insight from the new brain drain literature our analysis does not
provide strong support for a positive brain drain effect on the source country of emigration
– at least when abstracting from remittances and return migration.
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